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Looking for a virtuous pattern of 
growth. Some insights for discussion
Este artículo busca arrojar un poco más de luz en el actual debate «manufacturas frente a 
servicios» y su papel en el crecimiento económico, tomando como punto de partida la Co-
municación de la CE Por un Renacimiento Industrial Europeo. Se presentan dos criterios 
para evaluar las razones que justifican el apoyo a determinados sectores económicos (ya sea 
manufacturas o servicios): 1. la capacidad de generar empleo y 2. la capacidad de presentar 
un crecimiento positivo de la productividad. El artículo evalúa las manufacturas y los servi-
cios en función de estos dos criterios, utilizando la base de datos PREDICT, caracterizada 
por su elevada desagregación sectorial. La conclusión a la que se llega es que los sectores de 
servicios cumplen en general con los dos criterios mencionados, mientras las manufacturas 
no lo hacen. También se pone de manifiesto la importancia de los sectores TIC y los intensi-
vos en I+D, tanto manufactureros como de servicios.
Artikulu hau «fabrikazioa zerbitzuen kontra» egungo eztabaidari buruzkoa da, hazkunde ekono-
miko berriztatua nola lortu gaiaren baitan, eta abiapuntu gisa EBko komunikazio hau hartu da: 
Europako Berpizkunde Industriala. Sektore ekonomikoei (bai fabrikaziokoei bai zerbitzukoei) la-
guntzeko arrazoiak ebaluatzeko bi irizpide aurkezten ditugu: 1. Enplegua sortzeko gaitasuna eta 
2. Ekoizpen-hazkundearen adierazle positibo bat erakusteko gaitasuna. PREDICT datu-basea 
erabiltzen da bereizketa-maila esanguratsuekin, bi sektore horiek irizpide horiekiko ebaluatu 
daitezen. Artikuluaren ondorioa da zerbitzu-sektoreek aipatutako bi irizpideak betetzen dituzte-
la; fabrikazio-sektoreek, ordea, ez dituzte betetzen. Era berean, IKT eta IKT ez direnen I+G in-
tentsiboen jardueretan oinarritutako zerbitzu- eta fabrikazio-azpisektoreek duten garrantzia 
azpimarratzen da.
This paper addresses the current «manufacturing versus services» debate in relation to the 
question of how to unlock renewed economic growth, taking as point of departure the EC 
Communication For a European Industrial Renaissance. We present two criteria with which 
to evaluate the grounds for supporting economic sectors (either manufacturing or services): 
1 The capacity to generate employment and 2 The ability to display a positive rate of 
productivity growth. The highly disaggregated PREDICT database is used in order to 
evaluate both sectors on these criteria. Our paper concludes that service sectors fulfil both of 
the above-mentioned criteria, whereas manufacturing sectors do not. The importance of 
service and manufacturing sub-sectors rooted in ICT and non-ICT R&D-intensive activities 
is also highlighted. 
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1. IntrODUCtIOn
The European Commission Communication (2014), For a European Industrial 
Renaissance, clarifies the position of the EC on the issue of «how to unlock renewed 
economic growth?», when it states: «Europe urgently needs to strengthen the basis for 
post-crisis sustainable growth and modernization. To that end, it must send a clear 
signal of its commitment to reindustrialization, the modernization of Europe´s indus-
trial base and the promotion of a competitive framework for EU industry» (pg. 22). 
After listing a set of measures to achieve this goal, it concludes by defining a very pre-
cise target: «Finally, the objective of revitalization of the EU economy calls for the en-
dorsement of the reindustrialization efforts in line with the Commission´s aspiration 
of raising the contribution of industry to GDP to as much as 20% by 2020» (pg. 23).
The size of the industry (or manufacturing) sector is subject to much discussion 
due to the process of vertical disintegration of activities, as well as the globalization 
This paper expands the previous results obtained during the development of the PREDICT databases, es-
pecially Mas (2016). It has also benefited from the on-going results obtained in the current DICTA study. 
The authors gratefully thank the highly productive collaboration with the IPTS/JRC team of the EC. Spe-
cial thanks are due to Marc Bodganowicz, Andrea de Panizza, Giuditta di Prato, Ibrahim-Khoulilul Roh-
man from IPTS/JRC and Juan Fernández de Guevara from Ivie who have definitively contributed to the 
quality of the two projects upon which this paper is framed. 
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of the production process favoured by the development of new technologies. Accor-
ding to the so-called «value chain approach», industrial activities also include the 
services that are used in manufacturing activities for the provision of final manufac-
tured goods. However, even when this perspective is adopted, «a process of «dein-
dustrialization» can be observed in the EU as a whole, since applying a «value chain 
approach» reveals a decline in the combined manufacturing and related services 
share of GDP from 25.7% in 1995 to 22% in 2011. 
There are a number of reasons for this trend, including overall shifts in demand, 
significant improvements in productivity, companies externalizing business services 
to outside Europe, off-shoring of core manufacturing activities (notable in Asian 
countries) and changes in relative prices in favour of services – cfr. Baumol’s cost di-
sease1 (ECSIP, 2014, p. 9).
In the present paper we will not follow the «value chain approach», but the Na-
tional Accounts (NA) approach. That implies that we will consider the definition of 
manufacturing and service sectors according to the NA classifications as published 
by National Statistical Offices, and gathered by EUROSTAT in the case of the EU 
countries. Our aim is to contribute to the manufacturing /services debate on the ba-
sis of a NA data analysis. 
We will use these datasets to evaluate the role that is played by manufacturing and 
service sectors in economic growth according to two criteria. The first criterion is the 
contribution of manufacturing and service sectors to aggregate employment growth. 
One of the main problems facing the EU is the difficulty to generate enough employ-
ment quantity-wise and quality-wise in order to maintain welfare levels and the stan-
dard of living for current and future generations. This problem is especially acute in 
those countries who have suffered most from the austerity measures during the recent 
crisis. Our second criterion is the performance of each sector in terms of productivity 
growth. Productivity growth is a prerequisite for long term income growth per capita, 
which serves as an important yardstick for welfare. As Paul Krugman (1994) stated 
«Productivity isn´t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything». 
On that basis, we posit that a sector follows a virtuous path when it complies 
with both criteria of creating employment and achieving labour productivity 
growth. When these two conditions hold, then we will conclude that the presence of 
such a sector deserves to be reinforced within the overall structure of economies. 
This will be our focus, although we admit that further criteria could be considered 
within the context of the manufacturing versus services debate, such as: the opening 
to foreign markets through trade and its implication on the internationalization of 
firms; the contribution to improve the general competitiveness of the economy; or 
1  Baumol’s cost disease refers to a rise of salaries in jobs that have not experienced increases in labour 
productivity, but whose salaries rise in response to rising salaries in other jobs that did witness labour 
productivity growth.
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the creation and diffusion of technological knowledge through R&D and Innovation 
on behalf of the respective sectors. However, it is also true that the majority, if not 
all, of the potential alternative criteria end up being overshadowed by the increase in 
productivity growth criterion. 
By following these criteria, we do not restrict the analysis to the manufacture 
and service aggregates on a whole, but instead we use a highly disaggregated databa-
se which puts special emphasis on ICT sub-sectors –according to the OECD (2007) 
ICT definition- and a group of Non-ICT R&D-intensive sub-sectors. This database 
has been produced within the PREDICT2 (Prospective Insights on R&D in ICT) pro-
ject and is currently expanded and updated by the DICTA (Data for European ICT 
Industries Analysis) study. The Information Society Unit of the Institute for Prospec-
tive Technological Studies (JRC-IPTS) and the Valencian Institute of Economic Re-
search (Ivie) have respectively contributed from 2006 and 2013 to the development 
of the PREDICT database. The PREDICT database is managed by JRC-IPTS for the 
Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG 
CONNECT) of the European Commission. So far the database covers the period 
2006-2013, although a back casting to 2000 is due to be released in 2016. The infor-
mation covers the 28 countries integrating the actual EU, plus a set of developed 
and developing countries: US, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Brazil, Switzer-
land, Norway, Australia, Canada and Russia. 
The present paper is structured into four sections. After the current introduc-
tion, section 2 provides an overview of the evolution of manufacturing and service 
sectors during the 1995-2014 period from an aggregate perspective. It uses different 
sources in order to highlight the behaviour of these sectors during the complete eco-
nomic cycle which started in the mid-nineties in the last century, through to the 
most recent economic recovery that started in the EU in 2013. Section 3 focuses on 
the most recent period, 2006-2013, making use of the PREDICT database. It takes a 
more disaggregated view on sectoral evolutions during these years, and puts a sepa-
rate view on a set of ICT sub-sectors and Non-ICT R&D-intensive sub-sectors from 
both the manufacturing and services realm. The subsequent results that are presen-
ted in section 3 confirm, among others, the superiority of the US economy over the 
EU in terms of both criteria. Finally, section 4 summarizes the main conclusions. 
2. mAnUFACtUrIng AnD SErVICES (1995-2014). An OVErVIEw
This section reviews the performance of the manufacturing and service sectors in 
all the countries included in our sample for the period 1995-2014. Those years cover a 
period that spans the years between the economic upturn from the mid-nineties, over 
2  PREDICT database is available at: http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/PREDICT/PREDICT2015/
2015database.html. 
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the crisis period that started in 2007/2008 and the most recent economic recovery, 
which started -at least for a number of European countries- in 2013. To make our fin-
dings more relevant for «manufacturing versus services» debate, we analyze data both 
at the level of EU28, and separately for the EU15 and the New Member States (hereaf-
ter: NMS). As far as available data allows to maintain this three-fold focus, we keep up 
this distinction throughout the paper. As indicated before, we also include data on a 
number of non-European countries that serve as external points of reference.
Table 1 (pages 92 and 93) offers start and end-of-period information for the 
manufacturing and service sector on two variables: Gross Value Added (hereafter: 
GVA) and employment. The employment variable is measured in terms of persons 
employed. While tends to be considered a less adequate measure than number of 
hours worked, due to the lack of statistical information (especially for the beginning 
of the period of analysis), we had to compromise on this. As highlights from the way 
GVA in the manufacturing sector evolved, we can point at the following. 
First, the annual growth rate for the EU28, EU15 and the New Member States 
(NMS) was positive, but much higher in the NMS (4.95%) than in the EU15 
(1.1%). Almost all EU countries experienced a positive GVA growth rate. The only 
exceptions were Cyprus (-1.8%), Greece (-0.8%), Italy (-0.4%) and Luxembourg 
(-0.1%). On the opposite side of the spectrum, the fastest growing countries belon-
ged to the NMS group. Slovakia (6.9%), Poland (6.6%), Lithuania (6.1%), the 
Czech Republic (5.5%) and Estonia (5.4%) showed the highest rates. 
Second, the loss of weight of GVA manufacturing over total GVA was a general 
phenomenon. At the level of the EU15, the share of manufacturing over total GVA 
dropped from 19.6% in 1995 to 15.1% in 2014, while for the NMS this decline was 
of a minor magnitude, going from 20.9% to 20.3%, notably thanks to a positive evo-
lution in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland. Within the 
EU15 only Germany maintained its manufacturing share around 22.5% throughout 
the period of analysis. 
Thirdly, for the remaining –i.e., non-European– countries it is interesting to notice 
that all of them experienced a positive annual GVA growth rate, especially China 
(10.0%), India (6.1%) and Korea (6.4%). It is also worth mentioning that the US (2.3%) 
showed a more dynamic behaviour than the EU28 (1.6%) with regard to the evolution 
of manufacturing GVA. However, this did not impede that the US also witnessed a de-
clining share of manufacturing over total GVA from 16.8% in 1995 to 12.0% in 2014. 
The US economy is, therefore, a more services-reliant economy than the EU economy. 
Finally, the countries with the highest share of manufacturing in terms of GVA 
in 2014, were: Korea (31.0%), China (29.9%) and Taiwan (29.0%). These figures 
stand in sharp contrast with the low shares shown by Australia (6.8%), Norway 
(7.8%) and Canada (10.4%).
Looking for a virtuous pattern of growth. some insights for discussion
91
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
When looking at the service sector data, it can be observed that GVA sector 
growth was particularly strong among EU15 countries, which also explains why ser-
vice sector GVA in the EU28 on a whole grew at a higher rate than that of manufac-
turing (2.0% vs. 1.6%). In the NMS the opposite was the case (2.7% vs. 4.9%). This 
result highlights the importance of manufacturing for the NMS, whereas the service 
sector is the most dynamic sector in the EU15. The higher GVA dynamism on be-
half of service sectors is also characteristic for the non-EU countries we looked into, 
with the exception of Switzerland, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
In addition, service sector GVA increased its share in the total GVA in all coun-
tries, with the sole exception of Norway. EU28 services’ share rose from 66.8% to 
73.3% between 1995 and 2014, more than 6 percent points (hereafter: pp). For the 
NMS this increase was even greater, as in some countries the share of the service sec-
tor in the total GVA increased by more of 10 pp. (Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, Romania, 
etc.). The increase of the service sector share in the total GVA was more moderate in 
the case of the non-European countries, with the exception of China and India. In 
these two economies the weight of the service sector over the total GVA also grew 
with more than 10 pp. Thus, service GVA presents not only more dynamism, but 
also a general increase in its importance over total GVA within the sample of coun-
tries selected. 
The employment data for the manufacturing sector reveal rather different 
trends than what one derives from the GVA data. First of all, all EU28 countries 
(with the exception3 of Luxembourg) experienced negative annual rates, albeit in 
different degrees, with the UK showing a particularly negative tendency (-2.6%). 
The overall annual decline in the EU28 and EU15 amounted to -1.1%, and to -1.0% 
for the NMS. Within the group of non-EU countries, China (1.7%), India (1.2%) 
and Taiwan (1.1%) were the only ones displaying positive annual rates of 
manufacturing labour growth. Second, the share of manufacturing employment on 
total employment fell in all countries with the sole exception of China and Taiwan. 
In the US, it lost 5 percentage points (pp), from 15.3% in 1995 to 10.2%, a drop of a 
similar magnitude to that in the EU28, where it also fell 5 pp from 19.0% to 14.0%. 
In the case of the EU28, the decline was led primarily by the EU15 countries, as the 
drop experienced by the NMS was less important (around 3 pp). Moreover, these 
countries kept a higher share of employment in manufacturing compared to the 
EU15 countries, with particularly the Czech Republic (26.1%), Slovakia (21.6%) 
and Slovenia (20.3%) leading the way in manufacturing employment. Among the 
non-EU countries, Taiwan (27.3%) followed by China (18.7%), were the ones with 
the highest share of employment in manufacturing.
3  As for all small EU countries, data on Luxembourg has to be taken with caution. 
Matilde Mas, eva Benages
92
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
T
ab
le
 1
.  
SH
A
R
E
 O
V
E
R
 T
O
T
A
L
 G
V
A
 / 
E
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
 A
N
D
 A
N
N
U
A
L
 G
R
O
W
T
H
 R
A
T
E
S 
O
F
 M
A
N
U
F
A
C
T
U
R
IN
G
 A
N
D
  
 
SE
R
V
IC
E
S.
  1
99
5-
20
14
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
  (
p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l G
VA
 
G
VA
 a
nn
ua
l g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
s 1
99
5-
20
14
Sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nn
ua
l g
ro
w
th
 
ra
te
s 1
99
5-
20
14
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Se
rv
ice
s
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Se
rv
ice
s
 
19
95
20
14
19
95
20
14
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Se
rv
ice
s
19
95
20
14
19
95
20
14
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Se
rv
ice
s
Au
str
ia
20
.0
18
.4
65
.4
70
.6
2.
3
2.
0
18
.7
14
.7
63
.8
72
.5
-0
.3
1.6
Be
lg
iu
m
20
.4
13
.8
69
.6
77
.2
1.8
1.7
17
.5
11
.2
72
.9
80
.4
-1
.5
1.4
Bu
lg
ar
ia
14
.0
14
.7
61
.0
67
.6
2.
7
1.8
22
.6
17
.1
46
.1
55
.6
-1
.6
0.
8
Cr
oa
tia
20
.5
14
.3
60
.5
69
.8
1.2
2.
4
-
17
.1
-
63
.6
-
-
Cy
pr
us
10
.5
5.
0
73
.1
86
.9
-1
.8
3.1
14
.7
7.7
67
.0
80
.2
-2
.3
2.
0
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
23
.7
26
.6
56
.7
59
.3
5.
5
1.8
26
.5
26
.1
54
.5
59
.9
-0
.1
0.
5
De
nm
ar
k
17
.0
13
.5
71
.2
75
.6
0.
8
1.6
16
.5
10
.3
72
.2
80
.1
-2
.2
0.
9
Es
to
ni
a
19
.8
15
.7
62
.4
68
.4
5.
4
4.
0
24
.7
18
.4
55
.6
67
.4
-1
.8
0.
8
Fin
lan
d
25
.4
16
.7
62
.0
70
.6
2.
6
1.8
19
.3
13
.7
65
.6
73
.1
-0
.8
1.6
Fr
an
ce
16
.2
11
.2
72
.7
78
.9
1.4
1.8
15
.0
9.
9
73
.1
79
.6
-1
.5
1.2
Ge
rm
an
y
22
.8
22
.6
66
.0
69
.0
1.7
1.5
21
.2
17
.5
65
.8
73
.9
-0
.4
1.2
Gr
ee
ce
12
.1
9.
4
70
.3
80
.4
-0
.8
1.3
11
.2
8.
4
62
.3
73
.9
-1
.8
0.
6
Hu
ng
ar
y
21
.5
23
.5
61
.0
64
.4
3.
7
1.9
22
.0
19
.2
54
.0
65
.9
-0
.4
1.3
Ire
lan
d
23
.0
19
.7
61
.5
72
.8
4.
8
4.
5
-
11
.1
63
.1
76
.0
-1
.8
2.
6
Ita
ly
20
.9
15
.4
67
.6
74
.3
-0
.4
0.
8
21
.2
16
.2
65
.1
72
.4
-0
.9
1.1
La
tv
ia
20
.0
12
.2
60
.8
73
.4
2.
7
4.
6
-
13
.7
54
.9
68
.8
-1
.9
0.
7
Lit
hu
an
ia
18
.7
19
.3
57
.4
66
.0
6.1
4.
3
17
.3
15
.1
55
.0
66
.1
-1
.3
0.
3
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
13
.3
4.
9
76
.7
87
.8
-0
.1
3.
8
-
8.1
70
.3
79
.3
0.
3
3.
8
M
alt
a
20
.7
10
.0
68
.0
82
.8
-
-
24
.5
12
.0
65
.0
78
.9
-2
.4
2.
4
…
/…
Looking for a virtuous pattern of growth. some insights for discussion
93
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
Ne
th
er
lan
ds
17
.2
12
.1
69
.6
77
.0
1.5
2.
3
12
.9
8.
8
76
.2
82
.9
-1
.0
1.4
Po
lan
d
18
.2
18
.6
56
.5
64
.6
6.
6
3.
4
-
19
.1
45
.2
58
.3
-0
.3
1.7
Po
rtu
ga
l
18
.1
13
.3
66
.4
76
.1
1.0
1.7
22
.2
15
.4
52
.6
65
.9
-2
.0
1.2
Ro
m
an
ia
25
.2
23
.0
42
.5
58
.4
2.
3
2.
7
21
.2
18
.1
26
.9
42
.0
-2
.4
0.
8
Sl
ov
ak
ia
25
.7
20
.9
57
.5
62
.0
6.
9
2.
2
26
.2
21
.6
54
.1
65
.6
-0
.8
1.3
Sl
ov
en
ia
25
.3
23
.1
61
.0
64
.7
3.1
2.
6
30
.0
20
.3
47
.0
62
.4
-2
.0
1.5
Sp
ain
17
.6
13
.2
65
.1
75
.1
0.
9
2.
7
17
.2
11
.1
65
.3
78
.2
-0
.9
2.
3
Sw
ed
en
22
.8
16
.4
65
.9
72
.6
3.
2
2.
3
17
.5
12
.3
72
.6
77
.1
-1
.2
1.0
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
18
.8
10
.6
68
.5
78
.4
0.
0
2.
7
15
.8
8.1
74
.5
83
.0
-2
.6
1.5
EU
28
19
.7
15
.5
66
.8
73
.3
1.6
2.
0
19
.0
14
.0
63
.0
73
.2
-1
.1
1.3
EU
15
19
.6
15
.1
68
.0
74
.8
1.1
1.9
18
.0
12
.7
68
.6
77
.1
-1
.1
1.4
Ne
w 
M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s (
N
M
S)
20
.9
20
.3
55
.6
63
.3
4.
9
2.
7
22
.3
19
.4
43
.8
57
.1
-1
.0
1.2
No
rw
ay
12
.5
7.8
63
.8
60
.1
1.6
2.
8
12
.9
9.
2
74
.6
76
.9
-0
.4
1.5
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
19
.8
19
.0
71
.3
73
.0
2.
3
1.8
-
14
.0
-
74
.3
-
-
Au
str
ali
a
14
.0
6.
8
67
.8
70
.2
0.
8
3.
4
14
.2
8.
7
72
.1
76
.3
-0
.8
2.1
Ca
na
da
17
.4
10
.4
67
.9
70
.5
0.
7
4.
2
14
.0
9.
6
74
.6
78
.2
-0
.6
1.8
Ch
in
a
34
.8
29
.9
32
.9
46
.1
10
.0
10
.1
15
.7
18
.7
24
.8
38
.1
1.7
3.1
In
di
a
17
.4
12
.9
46
.2
57
.0
6.1
8.1
12
.4
11
.4
21
.1
26
.3
1.2
2.
9
Ja
pa
n
23
.5
20
.4
63
.7
70
.4
1.4
0.
8
20
.4
15
.1
61
.2
71
.3
-1
.9
0.
6
Ko
re
a
27
.8
31
.0
54
.6
59
.3
6.
4
4.1
22
.7
16
.9
55
.6
70
.0
-0
.4
2.
4
Ta
iw
an
27
.4
29
.0
61
.0
64
.8
5.
9
3.
6
27
.1
27
.3
50
.7
59
.6
1.1
2.
0
US
16
.8
12
.0
74
.7
78
.5
2.
3
2.
5
15
.3
10
.2
73
.8
79
.8
-1
.3
1.3
N
ot
e:
 L
at
es
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
 d
at
a 
on
 G
VA
 f
or
 A
us
tr
al
ia
, C
an
ad
a,
 C
hi
na
, I
nd
ia
, J
ap
an
, K
or
ea
, R
om
an
ia
 a
nd
 T
ai
w
an
 c
or
re
sp
on
d
s 
to
 2
01
3.
 L
at
es
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
 d
at
a 
on
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
fo
r 
C
an
ad
a,
 C
hi
na
, 
In
d
ia
, J
ap
an
 a
nd
 T
ai
w
an
 c
or
re
sp
on
d
s 
to
 2
01
3.
 M
al
ta
 is
 n
ot
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 E
U
28
 a
nd
 N
M
S 
G
VA
 ra
te
s 
of
 g
ro
w
th
. C
ro
at
ia
 is
 n
ot
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 E
U
28
 a
nd
 N
M
S 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t r
at
es
 o
f g
ro
w
th
.
So
ur
ce
: A
B
S,
 A
PO
, B
E
A
, C
an
ad
a 
St
at
is
tic
s,
 E
ur
o
st
at
, I
LO
, O
E
C
D
 a
nd
 o
w
n 
el
ab
o
ra
tio
n.
…
/…
Matilde Mas, eva Benages
94
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
T
ab
le
 2
.  
M
A
N
U
F
A
C
T
U
R
IN
G
 A
N
D
 S
E
R
V
IC
E
S 
L
A
B
O
U
R
 P
R
O
D
U
C
T
IV
IT
Y
. 1
99
5-
20
14
 
(E
ur
o
s 
P
P
S 
p
er
 p
er
so
n 
an
d
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
es
)
 
19
95
20
14
An
nu
al 
gr
ow
th
 19
95
-2
01
4
Co
nt
ib
ut
io
n 
to
 la
bo
ur
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 g
ro
w
th
 (p
p.
)
To
ta
l
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Se
rv
ice
s
To
ta
l
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Se
rv
ice
s
To
ta
l
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Se
rv
ice
s
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Se
rv
ice
s
Au
str
ia
46
,5
36
47
,5
94
49
,3
28
55
,5
78
79
,0
44
53
,2
92
0.
93
2.
67
0.
41
0.
51
0.
28
Be
lg
iu
m
53
,5
80
50
,7
09
55
,3
30
63
,3
21
93
,8
62
58
,6
24
0.
88
3.
24
0.
30
0.
55
0.
22
Bu
lg
ar
ia
13
,61
8
8,1
00
19
,9
50
20
,2
32
18
,21
1
23
,8
50
2.
08
4.
26
0.
94
0.
61
0.
60
Cr
oa
tia
21
,5
43
-
-
30
,61
6
25
,6
46
34
,5
25
1.8
5
-
-
-
-
Cy
pr
us
35
,8
90
27
,16
1
37
,74
1
42
,7
74
29
,6
23
46
,2
38
0.
92
0.
46
1.0
7
0.
04
0.
85
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
25
,7
30
17
,18
8
29
,8
57
39
,71
5
49
,2
62
38
,21
5
2.
28
5.
54
1.3
0
1.3
9
0.
75
De
nm
ar
k
41
,21
5
40
,2
72
40
,15
1
48
,7
80
70
,8
96
45
,74
3
0.
89
2.
98
0.
69
0.
45
0.
50
Es
to
ni
a
13
,9
32
7,
98
0
17
,13
5
32
,31
5
31
,2
66
31
,3
94
4.
43
7.1
9
3.1
9
1.2
8
2.
08
Fin
lan
d
41
,3
80
40
,10
2
43
,6
09
50
,4
02
76
,0
83
45
,7
32
1.0
4
3.
37
0.
25
0.
71
0.1
7
Fr
an
ce
48
,61
3
41
,5
56
50
,9
62
57
,18
1
72
,3
20
56
,8
92
0.
85
2.
92
0.
58
0.
40
0.
44
Ge
rm
an
y
45
,9
59
47
,9
23
46
,9
53
53
,2
30
70
,4
07
49
,8
35
0.
77
2.
02
0.
31
0.
46
0.
21
Gr
ee
ce
35
,14
2
32
,9
25
41
,6
49
42
,8
89
39
,31
1
46
,91
9
1.0
5
0.
93
0.
63
0.1
0
0.
47
Hu
ng
ar
y
21
,6
51
16
,3
37
27
,9
66
31
,2
62
35
,9
90
30
,9
67
1.9
3
4.1
6
0.
54
0.
94
0.
34
Ire
lan
d
53
,6
81
57
,9
20
56
,6
77
73
,0
85
13
3,
97
3
67
,9
97
1.9
3
5.
24
1.1
4
1.1
2
0.
76
Ita
ly
51
,47
9
46
,0
81
55
,3
98
50
,71
4
50
,7
36
52
,3
64
-0
.0
8
0.
51
-0
.3
0
0.
09
-0
.21
La
tv
ia
12
,5
98
9,
88
0
15
,9
48
30
,91
5
23
,7
96
33
,9
90
4.
72
4.
63
3.
98
0.
74
2.
67
Lit
hu
an
ia
13
,7
50
12
,3
87
15
,8
63
34
,9
05
50
,8
25
33
,3
96
4.
90
7.4
3
3.
92
1.4
1
2.
42
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
71
,3
57
52
,0
71
81
,11
9
72
,4
04
48
,2
72
80
,0
91
0.
08
-0
.4
0
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
6
M
alt
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
…
/…
Looking for a virtuous pattern of growth. some insights for discussion
95
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
Ne
th
er
lan
ds
47
,3
77
52
,3
54
44
,2
66
57
,0
64
85
,0
63
52
,8
40
0.
98
2.
55
0.
93
0.
37
0.
68
Po
lan
d
17
,7
58
12
,2
68
26
,18
4
34
,7
27
45
,71
3
36
,2
82
3.
53
6.
92
1.7
2
1.2
7
1.0
4
Po
rtu
ga
l
29
,6
84
19
,47
6
39
,0
45
37
,0
96
33
,9
38
43
,3
62
1.1
7
2.
92
0.
55
0.
46
0.
39
Ro
m
an
ia
10
,7
09
11
,5
69
20
,31
6
21
,8
67
28
,4
02
29
,0
44
3.
76
4.
73
1.8
8
1.1
4
0.
95
Sl
ov
ak
ia
23
,4
56
12
,6
81
30
,0
73
41
,5
99
54
,6
77
35
,71
7
3.
02
7.6
9
0.
91
1.7
9
0.
54
Sl
ov
en
ia
25
,8
64
18
,0
99
35
,5
47
41
,8
05
48
,10
2
43
,7
21
2.
53
5.1
4
1.0
9
1.2
4
0.
68
Sp
ain
46
,3
42
43
,2
23
46
,5
84
52
,3
82
61
,7
87
49
,8
83
0.
64
1.8
8
0.
36
0.
29
0.
25
Sw
ed
en
40
,41
5
36
,4
53
41
,0
90
55
,51
6
83
,5
40
51
,9
07
1.6
7
4.
36
1.2
3
0.
86
0.
85
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
45
,3
40
44
,2
33
42
,8
76
56
,47
9
71
,8
32
54
,3
24
1.1
6
2.
55
1.2
5
0.
38
0.
91
EU
28
39
,7
81
36
,0
50
44
,0
65
49
,71
5
60
,0
99
49
,7
28
1.1
7
2.
69
0.
64
0.
48
0.
45
EU
15
46
,3
43
44
,3
30
47
,5
57
54
,0
23
67
,3
47
52
,5
30
0.
81
2.
20
0.
52
0.
38
0.
37
N
M
S
17
,12
7
12
,9
24
25
,14
2
31
,7
39
40
,3
29
33
,9
24
3.
25
5.
99
1.5
8
1.2
4
0.
94
No
rw
ay
60
,14
6
46
,6
87
43
,0
79
67
,14
9
69
,11
2
55
,3
81
0.
58
2.
06
1.3
2
0.
21
0.
82
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
48
,9
97
-
-
56
,81
8
81
,7
20
55
,3
47
0.
78
-
-
-
-
Au
str
ali
a
46
,71
9
43
,16
5
43
,3
83
60
,01
5
57
,8
98
54
,3
54
1.3
9
1.6
3
1.2
5
0.1
7
0.
86
Ca
na
da
48
,3
73
50
,8
42
33
,3
40
57
,0
79
63
,6
97
51
,19
4
0.
92
1.2
5
2.
38
0.1
7
1.6
5
Ch
in
a
3,
29
3
6,
05
5
4,
85
7
15
,2
27
27
,16
2
17
,0
95
8.
51
8.
34
6.
99
2.
70
2.
76
In
di
a
3,
88
7
5,1
44
8,
31
2
9,
48
0
12
,5
39
21
,51
8
4.
95
4.
95
5.
28
0.
75
2.
73
Ja
pa
n
44
,9
80
44
,9
25
49
,4
90
53
,2
51
81
,4
43
51
,2
83
0.
94
3.
31
0.
20
0.
73
0.1
3
Ko
re
a
26
,10
7
26
,16
1
28
,7
00
47
,2
62
92
,11
8
39
,12
8
3.
30
6.
99
1.7
2
2.
06
0.
98
Ta
iw
an
37
,7
75
35
,7
69
47
,9
03
64
,3
27
84
,8
49
64
,7
84
2.
96
4.
80
1.6
8
1.3
5
1.0
5
US
62
,11
9
51
,8
95
64
,6
23
83
,3
75
10
2,
28
7
81
,6
21
1.5
5
3.
57
1.2
3
0.
51
0.
94
N
ot
e:
 L
at
es
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
 y
ea
r 
fo
r 
A
us
tr
al
ia
, C
an
ad
a,
 C
hi
na
, I
nd
ia
, J
ap
an
, K
or
ea
 a
nd
 T
ai
w
an
 c
or
re
sp
on
d
s 
to
 2
01
3.
 E
U
28
 a
nd
 N
M
S 
d
o 
no
t 
in
cl
ud
e 
C
ro
at
ia
 a
nd
 M
al
ta
. T
he
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 t
o 
la
b
ou
r 
p
ro
d
uc
tiv
ity
 o
f m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
 a
nd
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
d
o 
no
t a
d
d
 u
p
 th
e 
la
b
ou
r p
ro
d
uc
tiv
ity
 g
ro
w
th
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r r
em
ai
ni
ng
 a
ct
iv
ity
 s
ec
to
rs
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
ef
fe
ct
.
So
ur
ce
: A
B
S,
 A
PO
, B
E
A
, C
an
ad
a 
St
at
is
tic
s,
 E
ur
o
st
at
, I
LO
, O
E
C
D
 a
nd
 o
w
n 
el
ab
o
ra
tio
n.
…
/…
Matilde Mas, eva Benages
96
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
The employment evolution in the service sector was the opposite of what was 
observed for the manufacturing sector. All countries, without exception, experien-
ced positive annual growth rates with regard to service sector employment. In the 
EU28 it amounted to 1.3%, similar to in the EU15 (1.4%) and higher than in the 
NMS. It is interesting to highlight that the highest rates of annual growth in the ser-
vice sector corresponded to China (3.1%) and India (2.9%). Also the share of the 
service sector in total employment followed an opposite trajectory than the manu-
facturing sector. This share grew in all countries without exception, especially in the 
NMS group thanks in part to their lower initial levels. Within the non-EU countries, 
the most significant gains occurred in China, India and Korea. Moreover, it is worth 
pointing out that the most developed countries present a higher share of employ-
ment in the service sector (about 80%): Denmark (80.1%), Netherlands (82.9%), 
UK (83.0%), France (79.6%), the US (79.8%), Canada (78.2%), etc.
The above facts can be summarized under three headlines. First, the loss of 
weight of manufacturing activity on total economic activity is (almost) a general 
phenomenon, as it is reflected both in terms of its share in overall GVA and employ-
ment. However, while GVA in manufacturing continued to increase in most of the 
countries (albeit at a lower rate than total GVA), the destruction of manufacturing 
employment in absolute terms is a generalized fact. Second, the service sector pre-
sented positive growth rates in all countries without exception, both in terms of 
GVA and employment. And third, there is a general tendency for manufacturing ac-
tivities to abandon the most developed countries. The NMS in Europe and the Asian 
countries are becoming the factories for the world, as an expression of the changing 
positions that respective countries play in global value chains. 
Obviously, the way that (manufacturing and service sector) GVA and employ-
ment evolve have consequences on labour productivity performances. Table 2 pro-
vides an overview of evolutions with regard to this variable for the period 1995-
2014, distinguishing again between manufacturing and service sectors. The most 
important observations that follow from this table are the following. 
Firstly, there are noticeable differences in labour productivity between coun-
tries. In 2014 total labour productivity amounted to 83,375 €PPS4 per person in the 
US; in the EU28 it was 60% of that figure (49,715 €PPS) while China and India sta-
yed below 16,000 €PPS. Even among EU countries, there are considerable differen-
ces ranging from 20,232 €PPS in Bulgaria to 73,085 €PPS in the case of Ireland. In 
fact, within Europe, EU15 countries show a labour productivity that is more than 
70% above the NMS average. 
4  PPS stands for Purchasing Power Standard, an antificial currency unit used to express magnitudes of 
different countries into a common price frawework. PPP figures are obtained adjusting national curren-
cy figures using PPPs, are the currency conversion rates that equalize the purchasing power of different 
currencies by eliminating the differences in price levels between countries. In their simplest form, PPPs 
are relative prices that show the ratio of the prices in national currencies of the same good or service in 
different countries.
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Secondly, the superiority of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector cannot 
be considered to be a fact across the board in all countries and over time. In 1995, for 
instance, labour productivity in services was higher than in manufacturing in EU28, 
EU15, the NMS, Australia, India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the US. However, in 2014 
(and as a consequence, among other factors, of manufacturing’s higher rate of job des-
truction together with ongoing process of off-shoring of lower added value activities) 
labour productivity in manufacturing was higher in all countries with the sole excep-
tion of India among the non-European countries, and Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Esto-
nia, Greece, Italy Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Romania among the EU countries. 
Thirdly, even though the annual growth rate of labour productivity in manufac-
turing was higher than in services in almost all countries (Canada, India, Cyprus 
and Luxembourg being the exceptions), the contribution to aggregate productivity 
growth of services was, in general, higher if we look at the non-European countries, 
excluding Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The former is a consequence of the lower 
growth rates of services productivity together with its higher share in the GVA ag-
gregate. However, in the EU28 both contributions to productivity growth were al-
most similar (0.48 pp for manufacturing and 0.45 pp for services), as in the majority 
of EU Member States (19 out of 28 countries) the manufacturing sector had a hig-
her contribution than services to productivity growth. Only in Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands and the UK the contribution 
of the service sector to overall productivity growth was higher. 
As a consequence, it turns out that productivity growth relies more on the ma-
nufacturing sector in the case of EU countries for the timeframe considered5. This is 
not the case for the non-EU countries, as in most of them (except for Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan) the contribution of the service sector to the aggregated productivity 
growth is higher than that of manufacturing in almost all countries. Thus, these 
countries present in general higher levels of productivity than the EU28 and they 
rely more on the service sector.
The above-mentioned results can be summarized by the following assertion: 
manufacturing sectors are not more productive than services in all cases or 
everywhere. In fact, in some countries services have a higher impact than manufac-
turing in aggregate productivity, this result being particularly clear for countries 
with higher aggregated productivity levels, such as the US, Norway and Australia.
As mentioned at the outset, the present paper assesses the virtuous contribution 
of the manufacturing and service sector to economic growth on the basis of two cri-
teria: 1. capacity to generate employment and 2. ability to display a positive rate of 
productivity. The information provided in Figure 1 breaks the GVA annual growth 
rate for the period 1995-2014 down into the respective contributions of those two 
variables. Panel a) refers to the total economy. On the left-hand side, it shows the 
5  The reallocation of manufacturing activities to some NMS countries as well as intense job losses in man-
ufacturing during the crisis could partly explain this result (see Timmer et al., 2013; and Marin, 2006.
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values for the three EU ensembles (EU28, EU15 and NMS) together with the set of 
non-European countries included in the sample.  The right-hand side provides the 
information for the five biggest EU15 countries. As can be observed, there are stri-
king differences between the respective countries and groups of countries. In China, 
India, Korea, and the NMS, GVA growth stemmed mainly from labour productivity 
growth. In the US and the EU28 labour productivity was the main driver for GVA 
growth. The EU15, however, saw how both sources contributed almost equally to 
GVA growth. Looking more closely to the right-hand side of the table, one sees that 
while in the UK labour productivity had a higher contribution, the opposite was 
true for Spain and Italy. 
Panels b) and c) provide insights at sector level into manufacturing and services, 
showing to what extent productivity and employment variations explain the evolu-
tion of sectoral GVA. Panel b) shows how GVA growth among manufacturing sec-
tors is largely due to positive evolutions in terms of labour productivity and negative 
evolutions in terms of job creation. Only in China, India and Taiwan did employ-
ment show a positive contribution to GVA growth. Panel c), referring to services, 
provides a different picture: there one sees how both sources contribute positively to 
GVA growth in all countries, except for Italy. What stands out, is that only in China, 
India, Canada and the NMS was GVA growth more due to productivity growth than 
it was due to employment growth, while in the US, Taiwan and the UK both sources 
were equally responsible for the GVA growth in these three countries. 
Figure 1. CONTRIBUTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR PRODUCTI- 
 VITY TO TOTAL, MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES GVA  
 GROWTH IN EU AND NON-EU COUNTRIES. 1995-2014   
a) Total economy
 (percentage)
 
…/…
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b) Manufacturing
  
c) Services
Note: 1995-2013 for Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. EU28 and NMS do not include 
Croatia and Malta.
Source: ABS, APO, BEA, Canada Statistics, Eurostat, ILO, OECD and own elaboration.
Consequently, if we posit that a virtuous contribution to economic growth 
should be underpinned simultaneously by a positive evolution of productivity and 
employment creation, and we look at how the manufacturing and service sectors 
performed on those two criteria, it is clear that service sectors complied more with 
the indicated premise during the period 1995-2014. 
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3. FUrthEr EVIDEnCE FrOm thE 2006-2013 pErIOD
After presenting results at aggregated (sectoral) levels based on a period of 20 
years of time in the previous section, it is worth analyzing more deeply what is hap-
pening within manufacturing and service sectors, particularly regarding the beha-
viour of labour productivity per sector. PREDICT database contains a wealth of in-
formation which enables us to gain further insight into this issue thanks to its very 
detailed sectoral breakdown.
3.1.  Dynamics of productivity differences
Thereupon, Figure 2 provides a complementary view of the dynamics for the 
EU28 countries as compared to a set of non-European countries, but in this case for 
a more limited period of time, i.e., the years 2006-2013, for which PREDICT data is 
available. The figures plot the differences between the non-EU countries and the 
EU28 average in terms of labour productivity in the initial and final year of the 
2006-2013 period. Panel a) refers to the differences in labour productivity at the le-
vel of the economy as a whole, while panels b) and c) draw up similar comparisons 
at the level of manufacturing and service sectors. In the figure the zero line indicates 
Figure 2.  DYNAMICS OF PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES OF OTHER  
 ECONOMIES VS. THE EU28 AVERAGE. 2006 AND 2013 
a) Total economy
 
(Thousands of 2010 Euros PPS)
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b) Manufacturing
 
c) Services
Note: EU28  aggregated labour productivity in 2006 = 56.4; in 2013 = 58.2. EU28 manufacturing  labour 
productivity in 2006 = 53.7; in 2013 = 57. EU28 services labour productivity in 2006 = 52; in 2013 = 52.8. Latest 
available data for Canada  and Japan corresponds to 2012.
Source: PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie and JRC-IPTS.
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the value of the EU28 average, while the arrowhead indicates the deviation from that 
value for each country in the final year (2013), and the bottom shows its deviation 
in the initial year, 2006. In principle, each panel is divided into four areas.6 The dis-
tinction between these four areas is based on two criteria: 1. the productivity level, 
which can be higher or lower than the EU28 average (above or below zero on the y-
axis), and the dynamics followed: converging or diverging to the EU28 average, de-
pending on whether the differences with the EU28 average have decreased or increa-
sed in the analyzed period (that is, if the countries’ arrows are moving towards or 
away from zero). Thus, the four areas that can be distinguished are (from left to 
right): I. Lower productivity than EU28 average and diverging; II. Lower productivity 
than EU28 average and converging; III. Higher productivity than EU28 average and 
converging; and IV. Higher productivity than EU28 average and diverging. 
In panel a) there are three countries that belong to the group of countries that go 
under the label of Higher productivity than EU28 average and diverging. These are Aus-
tralia, Taiwan, and the US. Particularly the US had a productivity level that was higher 
than the EU28 in 2006. While the US and Taiwan increased this gap in 2013, the gain 
of Australia over the EU28 had only expanded marginally in 2013. Most countries in 
panel a) fall into the group Lower productivity than EU28 average and converging, 
which includes India, China, Russia and Korea. Finally, the positions of Canada and 
Japan almost remained constant in relation to the EU28. The evolution of the produc-
tivity level in these two countries was similar to that of the EU28 but while Canada’s 
productivity level was above EU28 average, for Japan it was below this value. 
Based on the same parameters and measurement point, albeit exclusively with 
regard to manufacturing sectors, panel b) shows how two Asian countries, Taiwan 
and Korea (particularly the latter), while belonging to group IV (Higher productivity 
than EU28 average and diverging), gained positions during the 2006-2013 period. 
However, within the group of countries with a higher labour productivity level than 
the EU28, it was especially the US that expanded its lead over the EU28 when com-
paring 2013 to 2006. Meanwhile, India and Australia (belonging to the Lower pro-
ductivity than EU28 and diverging-group) presented a deteriorating performance 
compared to the EU28 from 2006 to 2013. The same happened in the case of Japan 
and Canada, although these two countries were above the EU28 productivity avera-
ge (Higher productivity than EU28 average and converging), which allowed the EU28 
to improve its position. On the other hand, China and Russia approached the EU28 
average during this period, with both of them starting off from a lower labour pro-
ductivity level (Lower productivity than EU28 average and converging-group).
In a similar way as panel b), panel c) visualizes labour productivity evolutions at 
the service sectoral front. It highlights the increasing labour productivity gap in ser-
vices between the US and the EU28, which was already very significant in 2006. In 
6  Take note that for one or more areas there are no observations.
…/…
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that year, labour productivity in the US service sector was 145.6% higher than in the 
EU28, while in 2013 the gap increased to 161.3%. At the other end, India, China, 
Russia, Korea and Canada approached EU28 levels over time, thus showing a con-
vergence towards the EU28 (belonging to group II). Overall, the service data indica-
te that the non-EU countries included in the sample performed better than the 
EU28 during the 2006-2013 period. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn when we look at productivity evolutions at 
the level of the entirety of economic activities (shown in figure 2a). Only in Austra-
lia, Canada and Japan did the overall productivity rate grow at a similar pace as it 
did for the EU28.
Figure 3.  EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY CONTRIBU- 
 TIONS TO TOTAL GVA GROWTH IN EU AND NON-EU  
 COUNTRIES. 2006-2013                                                       (percentage)
Note: 2006-2012 for Canada and Japan.
Source: PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie and JRC-IPTS.
3.2.  productivity growth at sectoral disaggregation level
Figures 3 assesses further how the entire set of economic activities in different 
(groups of) countries behave in terms of GVA growth, of labour productivity 
growth and employment creation growth between 2006 and 2013. We can observe 
striking differences between China and India, as well as Korea and Taiwan (albeit to 
a lesser extent), and the remaining countries, especially the EU15. The first two 
countries presented GVA annual growth rates of more than 7%, based almost exclu-
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sively on labour productivity growth. Although the US and the NMS had lower rates 
of GVA growth, it was also based on the same driver. In fact, except for Australia 
and Canada, the labour productivity performance is the main basis for the GVA 
growth in the non-EU countries and the EU aggregations.
Of the five big EU15 countries considered, the performance was very modest for 
Germany, the UK and France, while Spain and Italy showed negative GVA rates of 
growth. However, it is interesting to notice that while Spain experienced increases in 
labour productivity and job destruction simultaneously, in the case of Italy both sour-
ces contributed negatively to GVA growth (contributed positively to GVA decrease).
Figure 4 broadens the perspective given in Figure 3 by making use of the secto-
ral disaggregations provided by the PREDICT database presented in Table 3. Accor-
ding to this table, the total GVA7 of manufacturing and service sectors can be classi-
fied in three groups: 1. ICT8; 2. Non ICT but R&D intensive; and 3. Other. Figure 
4a) offers the information for manufacturing sectors and 4b) for services.9
Figure 4a) shows some facts worth highlighting. First, panel 4a.1) confirms the 
general profile already shown in Figure 1.b) for period 1995-2014 of a GVA growth 
in manufacturing based fundamentally on labour productivity accompanied by job 
destruction. This second characteristic was more pronounced in the period 2006-
2013 as a consequence of the economic crisis. Second, contrary to what could be ex-
pected, panel 4a.2) shows a very sharp decrease in employment in the ICT manufac-
turing sector, together with a relatively low labour productivity growth in some 
countries (such as the US, Canada and the NMS) and negative in others (EU28 and 
EU15 –including Germany and France but not the UK or Spain–, India or Japan). 
Third, the group of manufacturing sub-sectors which has fared better is the one la-
belled as Non ICT manufacturing R&D intensive sub-sectors in table 3. It is interes-
ting to notice that in most countries labour productivity growth was positive, and 
that job variation was either positive or, if negative, of a lower intensity than in the 
case of ICT manufacturing sub-sectors. And fourth, and as was to be expected, the 
group corresponding to Other manufacturing sub-sectors showed a mixed pattern 
7  The PREDICT database considers the following variables, with the same level of sectoral disaggrega-
tion as the one presented in table 3: GVA, Employment (number of workers); labour productivity (in 
terms of employed workers); Business R&D expenditure; Business R&D Personnel; and Business R&D 
Researchers. 
8  The ICT group follows the OECD (2007) definition.
9  The selection of these sectoral groups is due to the important role assigned to ICT industries in terms 
of productivity performance in the last years and the necessity of distinguishing, within the non-ICT 
sectors, between intensive and non-intensive knowledge sectors. The basis to elaborate this distinction 
are the available Eurostat classifications of sectors by level of knowledge intensity (High-Tech industries, 
KIS (knowledge intensive services) and KIA (knowledge intensive activities)) combined with R&D in-
tensity data by sector.
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but with a landscape dominated by job destruction and relatively low rates of pro-
ductivity growth, with the usual exception of China and Korea.
Table 3.  SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION
Sectors NACE Rev. 2
Total Manufacturing 05-33
 ICT Manufacturing  
 Manufacture of electronic components and boards 261
 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 262
 Manufacture of communication equipment 263
 Manufacture of consumer electronics 264
 Non-ICT manufacturing R&D intensive  
 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 20
 
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and 
botanical products
21
 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 27-28
 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 29
 Manufacture of other transport equipment 30
 Other manufacturing n.e.c.
   
Total services 45-99
 ICT Services  
 Telecommunications 61
 Computer and related activities 5820, 62, 631, 951
 Non-ICT Services R&D intensive  
 Transportation and storage 49-53
 Information and communication (except ICT services) 58-63
 Financial and insurance activities 64-66
 Professional, scientific and technical activities 69-75
 Administration and support service activities 76-82
 Education 85
 Human health and social work activities 86-88
 Other services n.e.c.
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure 4.(a)  MANUFACTURING SECTOR: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR  
 PRODUCTIVITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO GVA GROWTH BY  
 SUB-SECTOR TYPE IN EU AND NON-EU COUNTRIES. 2006-2013 
                                                  
(percentage)
a.1.  Total manufacturing
  
a.2.  ICT manufacturing
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a.3.  Non ICT manufacturing
  
a.4.  Other manufacturing
  
Note: 2006-2012 for Canada and Japan.
Source: PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie and JRC-IPTS.
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Figure 4.(b)  SERVICE SECTOR: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  
 CONTRIBUTIONS TO GVA GROWTH BY SUB-SECTOR TYPE IN  
 EU AND NON-EU COUNTRIES. 2006-2013                      
 (percentage)
b.1.  Total services
  
b.2.  ICT services
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b.3.  Non ICT services R&D intensive
  
b.4.  Other services
  
Note: 2006-2012 for Canada and Japan.
Source: PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie and JRC-IPTS.
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A rather opposite view is provided by figure 4.b), showing similar information 
but referring to service sub-sectors. Panel 4b.1) for total services reinforces the view 
already offered by figure 1c) for the period 1995-2014 of positive job creation to-
gether with positive, albeit slow, labour productivity growth, with the exceptions of 
China and India where it was very intense. Panel 4b.2) illustrates again the same 
view but now refers to the ICT services sector. Job creation was the rule in all coun-
tries but Italy. However, labour productivity had a negative contribution to GVA in 
the EU (both in the EU15 and the NMS, and thus also in the EU28), where it was 
particularly intense in Spain, but also worth mentioning in France and Italy. The 
group denominated Non ICT services R&D intensive (panel 4b.3)) showed a virtuous 
behaviour, as had already happened within the same typology for manufacturing. In 
this case, although labour productivity contributions were negative in Korea, Japan, 
EU15 and three of the five biggest European countries (Germany, the UK and Italy), 
they were not comparable to those observed for ICT service sub-sectors. Finally, and 
contrary to the Other manufacturing group shown in figure 4a.4), the Other services 
group (panel 4b.4)) also presented a virtuous behaviour with a higher contribution 
of labour productivity growth than of job creation. 
3.3.  productivity growth and the ICt sector
The upsurge of aggregate labour productivity in the US by the mid-nineties in 
the last century, as opposed to the more sluggish rate in the EU, was attributed to 
the ICT revolution whose results started to appear in the statistics a few years after 
Solow´s (1987) much cited remark: «You can see the computer age everywhere but 
in the productivity statistics». What became known as Solow´s computer paradox re-
fers to the discrepancy between measures of investment in information technology 
and measures of output at the national level. Since then a great deal of effort was put 
into improving the measurement of the contribution made by capital services in ge-
neral, and ICT assets in particular, to productivity growth. The work of Jorgenson, 
Ho and Stiroh (2005), Jorgenson, Landefeld and Nordhaus (2006) and the two 
OECD Manuals: Measuring Productivity (2001) and Measuring Capital (2009) have 
been fundamental in improving our understanding of the role played by ICT in eco-
nomic growth. 
The primary impact of ICT on productivity growth was signalled in ICT produ-
cing sub-sectors via technological progress captured by the Multifactor Productivity 
(MFP) term (see Biagi [2013] for a review). This positive effect spreads to the remai-
ning sectors with a larger impact on those which use ICT assets more intensively. 
This spillover effect is due not only to its direct impact on labour and capital produc-
tivity but also due to MFP. Generally speaking, ICT has generated three different ty-
pes of decisive contributions to: i) the economic globalization phenomena; ii) the 
vertical disintegration of the production process; and iii) the organizational changes 
within firms. 
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ICT assets have broadened the milieu relevant for their users, both for firms and 
the population at large, who now have access to a (practically) universal knowledge. 
For this reason, there has been an increase in the competitive pressure on producti-
vity and the need for excellence in the process of production. ICT allows firms to 
become more productive, but it also puts pressure on the less efficient ones to leave 
the market. As a consequence, the more productive firms gain market share, raising 
the average labour productivity. From a political standpoint, the main message is 
that the increase in size of the most efficient firms should be favoured, while the less 
productive ones should leave the market. 
The effect of ICT on productivity growth operates through the three classical 
channels: I) labour quality, since ICT allows this aspect to be improved through edu-
cation and professional training; ii) technological progress embedded in capital assets, 
with the additional advantage of the sustained fall in their prices, especially hard-
ware; and iii) Multifactor Productivity (MFP), since it allows the organization and 
management of firms to be improved, including favouring innovation, the develop-
ment of new services, the adjustment of products to meet the firm´s needs, new de-
signs and the speed of reaction to changing market conditions, etc.
From the sectoral perspective, we may distinguish between sectors that produce 
ICT goods and services to sell and the remaining ones that use ICT goods and servi-
ces as assets for the sake of their own value creation processes. Figure 4 has shown 
the performance of ICT manufacturing sub-sectors (panel 4a.2) and ICT service 
sub-sectors (panel 4b.2) from the double perspective of job creation and productivi-
ty growth. From the first perspective, the main conclusion was that while ICT ma-
nufacturing sub-sectors reduced the number of workers, ICT service sub-sectors in-
creased them. These developments could stem from, at least partly, the vertical 
disintegration process to which we referred above. At the same time, the increase in 
the number of workers in the ICT manufacturing sub-sectors in China and India is 
an example of the globalization process.
Figure 5 offers an alternative representation of the evolution of the second 
component (labour productivity) in the ICT sector. It shows the annual rates of 
productivity growth in the ICT sector in a decreasing order for the period 2006-
2013. It also shows the different performance of ICT manufacturing and service 
sub-sectors. The most noticeable facts are the following. First, the highest rates of 
productivity growth corresponded to the Asian countries, with Korea taking the 
leading role. Second, of the set of countries included in the sample, only the EU and 
its aggregates (EU28, EU15 and NMS) presented negative rates of growth. Within 
the five big EU15 countries, only the UK showed a positive rate of growth. 
Meanwhile Spain, Italy and France showed negative, and not negligible, rates of 
variation. Third, a general pattern cannot be found for manufacturing and service 
sectors. For some countries within the same region, ICT sub-sector productivity 
growth can be driven by manufacturing while for others services take the lead. On 
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the other hand, while in some countries, such as Taiwan, Russia and the US, both 
manufacturing and services presented positive rates of growth, in other countries, 
such as Korea, Japan, India and the NMS, the two sectors contributed with different 
signs. Thus, further research is needed.
Figure 5.  ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF ICT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  
 IN EU AND NON-EU COUNTRIES. 2006-2013
 (percentage)
Note: 2006-2012 for Canada and Japan.
Source: PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie and JRC-IPTS.
However, what seems indisputable is that along the period 2006-2013 labour 
productivity growth in the EU28 ICT sector was lower than in all the countries in-
cluded in the sample, which had already happened with the total economy, as 
shown by figure 2.a. Figure 6 illustrates that in 2006 only the US had a higher labour 
productivity in the ICT sector than the EU28. In the following years, up to 2013, the 
gap increased due to the superior performance of the US. Three other countries, 
which in 2006 had a lower labour productivity level than the EU28, had already sur-
passed it in 2013: Taiwan, Korea and Australia. And the remaining five have all ex-
perienced a convergence process to the EU28 average.
The information provided so far has highlighted two relevant facts. First, the supe-
riority of the US economy in almost all aspects analysed. And second, the clear un-
derstanding that the Non-ICT R&D intensive sub-sectors have performed better than 
the ICT sub-sectors. Figure 7 offers interesting information using a similar presentation 
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to figures 2 and 6. The reference continues to be the EU28 average, but the compari-
son is made now with respect to the US belonging to the two groups just mentioned.
Figure 6.  DYNAMICS OF THE ICT SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY  
 DIFFERENCES OF OTHER ECONOMIES VS. THE EU28  
 AVERAGE. 2006 AND 2013 
 (Thousands of 2010 Euros PPS)
Note: EU Labour productivity in 2006 =98.4; EU Labour productivity in 2013 = 89.6. Latest available data for 
Canada and Japan corresponds to 2012.
Source: PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie and JRC-IPTS.
The first noticeable fact is that the superiority of the US with respect to the 
EU28, in terms of labour productivity growth, applies to the eighteen sub-sectors 
analysed without exception both in 2006 and in 2013 (all the arrows are located 
above the zero line which reflects the EU28 average). Second, in only two sub-sec-
tors, one of which belongs to the ICT group (Manufacture of computers and periphe-
ral equipment) and the other to the Non-ICT R&D intensive group (Transportation 
and Storage), the productivity in the EU28 has grown at a higher rate than in the US. 
Thus, those two sub-sectors were the only ones (particularly the first) converging to 
the EU28 average. Third, the most striking fact is, however, the US superiority in 
two Non-ICT R&D intensive sub-sectors: Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemical and botanical products, and Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products. 
In 2006 the productivity in the US of the first sub-sector was 76% higher than in the 
EU28. In 2013 the gap had increased to 136%.
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Figure 7.  DYNAMICS OF US-EU28 PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BY  
 SUB-SECTOR. 2006 AND 2013 
 (Thousands of 2010 Euros PPS)
Note: ICT sectors marked in bold. The codification of sector can be found in the box to the left (NACE Rev.2 
codes in brackets).
Source: PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie and JRC-IPTS.
These results seem to indicate that the benefits of ICT technologies, which were 
initially concentrated in the ICT manufacturing sector, have spilled over to other 
sub-sectors which use them intensively, in combination with also an intensive use of 
R&D. These spillover effects have been particularly intense in the US, favouring the 
increase of its labour productivity at a much higher rate than in the EU28. 
4. COnCLUDIng rEmArkS
This paper contributes to the current reindustrialization debate by offering 
empirical evidence on the performance of manufacturing and service sectors. The 
analysis has been carried out within an international context, considering the 28 
countries belonging to the EU28 and nine other developed and developing 
countries. It makes use of the PREDICT database elaborated by Ivie-IPTS (JRC). 
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The main features of the database are the high level of sectoral disaggregation, as 
well as the emphasis on ICT producing activities and on R&D expenditures made by 
the business sector.  Our paper proposes a double criterion for evaluating the role 
played by both types of activities in economic growth: 1. The capacity of a given 
sector to contribute to aggregate employment creation; and 2. The evolution of 
labour productivity within a given sector. According to this double criterion, we 
propose that a given sector deserves support if it shows simultaneously positive 
employment and labour productivity growth. The main contributions of the paper 
are the following. 
If we refer to the last complete cycle of 1995-2014, we can conclude that: 1. Data 
confirms that the loss of weight of the manufacturing sector is a (practically) general 
phenomenon both in terms of GVA and employment. However, while GVA showed 
positive rates of growth, employment destruction was (almost) the general rule. On 
the contrary, the service sector presented positive growth rates in all countries 
without exception, both in terms of GVA and of employment. From a geographical 
point of view, there is general tendency for manufacturing activities to abandon the 
most developed countries for developing countries, taking advantage of the «global 
value chains”10. 2. Manufacturing activities are not more productive than services 
always and everywhere. In fact services have a higher contribution to aggregate pro-
ductive growth in the most developed countries.  3. If we make use of the proposed 
double criterion for the period 1995-2014, we might conclude that in (almost) all 
countries the service sector fulfils both criteria with very few exceptions (i.e. Italy). 
On the contrary, for the manufacturing sector only China, India and Taiwan 
showed a virtuous pattern of growth.
If we focus on the most recent period, covered by the PREDICT database, 2006-
2013, we may conclude that the performance of the EU28 can only be labelled as 
modest in terms of productivity growth. For the total economy, seven out of nine 
countries included in the sample experienced a higher rate of productivity growth 
than the EU28, while for the remaining two (Japan and Canada) it was similar. For 
manufacturing activities, the EU28 performed better than four countries (India, 
Australia, Japan and Canada), while in services the nine countries performed better 
than the EU28. The US is the indisputable leader in terms of productivity growth. 
The PREDICT database allows us to classify the sectors into three sub-groups 
for both manufacturing and services: i) ICT; ii) Non-ICT R&D intensive; and iii) 
Other. From the perspective of the proposed double criterion, the main results are 
the following: 1. With respect to manufacturing sector, the job destruction was ge-
neralized in (almost) all countries. This process was especially intense in ICT manu-
facturing sub-group; only China, Taiwan and India created employment during 
those years. Something similar could be said about the group «Other» under the 
10  See Stehrer et al (2015), Di Mauro et al (2013) and De Backer and Miroudot (2013).
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manufacturing sector. The group labelled Non-ICT R&D intensive has shown the 
best performance according to the double virtuous criterion. 2. With respect to the 
service sector, the results are quite different. The ICT service sub-group created em-
ployment in all countries but it was accompanied by negative labour productivity 
growth rates in the EU countries, especially in the NMS. However, the fulfilment of 
the double virtuous criterion was (almost general) for the service sub-group Non-
ICT R&D intensive and also for sub-group «Other». 
Thus, the ICT manufacturing sub-group did not fulfill the double criterion due 
to the process of job destruction. In the case of ICT service sub-group only the EU28 
(and also the EU15 and the NMS) did not fulfil the second criterion since they expe-
rienced negative labour productivity growth. Furthermore, the nine non-EU coun-
tries experienced higher productivity growth in the ICT sector than the EU28. 
However, one of the most striking facts revealed by the data is that the US superiori-
ty in terms of labour productivity is concentrated in six sub-sectors: three belonging 
to Non-ICT R&D intensive group: Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal che-
mical and botanical products; Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; 
and Information and communication, except computer and related activities. And 
another three to ICT group: Manufacture of communication equipment; Manufac-
ture of electronic components and boards; and Telecommunications. The gap is es-
pecially noticeable in the first two sub-sectors. 
All in all we may conclude that the EU has two main problems: high unemploy-
ment rates -especially in the peripheral countries such as Spain- and a weak perfor-
mance in terms of labour productivity growth, which has become more acute in the 
last few years of the crisis.  From our point of view, the proposed reindustrialization 
is not going to solve either one of these problems if we take into account that only 
some Asian countries (China, India and Taiwan) are creating jobs in manufactu-
ring, and that it is not guaranteed that labour productivity growth is higher in ma-
nufacturing than in service sectors. For the EU, the disappointing behaviour of this 
variable affects both manufacturing and service activities. Thus, the target should 
not be reindustrialization but rather the general improvement in the functioning of 
the economy in terms of productivity.
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